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Curran: The Textalyzer: The Constitutional Cost of Law Enforcement Techno

NOTE

THE TEXTALYZER: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COST
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a
crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the
crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence. That prohibition
exception; it lies at the very heart of the
is categorical and without
1
Fourth Amendment.

The unlawful use of mobile telephones, especially "smartphones" 2
(as well as other portable electronic devices),3 has drastically increased
the prevalence of distracted driving.4 Statistics from the National Safety
Council ("Council") found that motor vehicle deaths were eight percent
higher in 2015 than 2014-the largest year-over-year increase in fifty
years.5 The Council estimated 38,300 people were killed and 4.4 million
were seriously injured on U.S. roads in 2015, making 2015 the deadliest
driving year since 2008.6 In 2001, the New York State Legislature
enacted a law prohibiting the use of mobile telephones (and
subsequently amended the law to include portable electronic devices)
while driving. 7
1. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Fredrick Kunkle, More Evidence that Smartphones and Driving Don't Mix, WASH. POST
(Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2017/04/04/more-evidence-thatsmartphones-and-driving-dont-mix/?utm term=.e5656bdfcO3c (citing statistical data to support the
proposition that "smartphones" have made the nation's highways significantly more dangerous).
3. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-c(1)(a) (McKinney 2018) (defining "mobile telephone"
for purposes of statute); id § 1225-c(l)(c) (codifying unlawful use of mobile telephones while
driving); id. § 1225-d (codifying unlawful use of portable electronic devices while driving).
4. Fred Myatt, 10 Causes of Distracted Driving, ZURICH INS. (June 6, 2017),
https://www.zurichna.com/en/knowledge/articles/2017/06/top-10-causes-of-distracted-driving.
5. Motor Vehicle Deaths Increase by Largest Percent in 50 Years, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nsc.org/in-the-newsroom/motor-vehicle-deaths-increase-by-largestpercent-in-50-years.
6. Id.
7. See VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-c (mobile telephones); id. § 1225-d (portable electronic
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Notwithstanding such enactment, recent reports indicate that sixtyseven percent of drivers admit to continued use of their cell phones
while driving, despite knowledge of the inherent danger that comes with
distracted driving. 8 State law enforcement has encountered great
difficulty in enforcing current bans against mobile phone use while
driving, 9 which led to legislative efforts in New York to empower law
enforcement with "electronic scanning device" technology.1" An
electronic scanning device can immediately identify recent mobile phone
usage at the scene of a motor vehicle accident, which would facilitate
enforcement of the pertinent Vehicle and Traffic Laws in the state.I1 The12
specific device at issue in this Note has been dubbed "the Textalyzer,"
given its similarities to the device used for combatting drunk driving,
' 13
known as "the Breathalyzer."
However, the categorical use of electronic scanning technology
would not come without significant privacy implications. 4 Notably, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recently decided legal issues involving the
administration of warrantless breath tests, 5 as well as a seminal case
devices).

8. See N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6, 2016); N.Y.
Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015). Section 1 of both the New
York State Senate and Assembly proposals, entitled "Legislative Intent," cites these statistics to
justify the legislation, which aims to treat the impairment of distracted driving with similar
methodology to that of drunk driving. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613
(Section 1).
9. Talea Miller, Enforcement of Texting-While-Driving Ban Proves a Tough Task, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/transportation-july-dec09textingl0-01.
10. See Janet Bums, New York Could Adopt "Textalyzer" Device for Busting Distracted
Drivers,FORBES (May 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwbums/2017/05/15/new-yorkcould-be-first-to-adopt-textalyzer-for-catching-distracted-drivers/#580eaac94415.
11. Interview by Jeff Rossen with Jim Grady, CEO, Cellebrite USA Corp, in Glen Rock, NJ
(NBC television broadcast June 21, 2017), https://www.today.com/money/rossen-reports-howtextalyzer-can-tell-if-you-were-texting-t 112973.
12. See Matt Richtel, On Your Phone at the Wheel? Watch Out for the Textalyzer, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2016, at Al.
13. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613 (Section 1). Section 1 of both
legislative proposals indicates that studies have shown texting while driving impairs a driver to the
level functionally equivalent to that of .08 blood alcohol content and that it is in the State's interest
to treat distracted driving with a similar methodology used to combat drunk driving. See N.Y.S.B.
A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613 (Section 1).
14. See generally Karen Turner, A Proposed "Textalyzer" Bill Might Give Cops the Right to
Access Your Cellphone, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/04/13/a-proposed-textalyzer-bill-might-give-cops-the-right-to-access-yourcellphone/?utm term=.f951f0a42030 (discussing the New York proposal and highlighting the
pertinent Fourth Amendment privacy concerns).
15. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166-67 (2016); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
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implicating Fourth Amendment protections concerning warrantless
searches of digital contents stored on cell phones. 6 The nation's highest
Court also, in its 2017 term, heard a landmark digital privacy case, the
effects of which could be felt for generations-irrefutable proof that the
17
twenty-first century legal battle over digital privacy is just beginning.
An article in the New York Times has opined that the New York
"Textalyzer" plan to combat distracted driving is the most provocative
yet. 8 Not only would this legislative proposal provide law enforcement
officers with unfettered discretion to field test-without any indicia of
individualized suspicion-the cell phones of both drivers involved at
every motor vehicle accident, but drivers could also have their licenses
suspended for refusing to turn over their devices for testing upon request
19
from an officer.
This Note argues that the proposed New York Textalyzer
legislation-specifically the concept of field-testing a cell phone-under
its current framework (that is, at any accident), constitutes an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.2" This Note posits a novel solution to make the New York
legislation less intrusive under the Fourth Amendment,21 which may
ensure the constitutionality of the device's use.22 This solution will
utilize, inter alia, the law and jurisprudence concerning warrantless
breath (and chemical) searches in drinking and driving cases as a guide
to measure how to achieve constitutionality in the context of
23
the Textalyzer.
Part II reviews the current law governing tests and searches
regarding drinking and driving 24 and provides an impartial overview of
the proposed New York Legislation 25 and the relevant Fourth
16. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (unanimously holding that the
warrantless search exception following a lawful arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer
safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data on a cell
phone).
17. Jeffrey Rosen, A Liberal-ConservativeAlliance on the Supreme Court Against Digital
Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
11i/bipartisanship-supreme-court/547124.
18. Richtel, supra note 12.
19. See N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6, 2016); N.Y.
Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015) (the New York State Senate
and Assembly proposals of the bill, respectively).
20. See infra Part H1.
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part lV.B.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Part B.A.
25. See infra Part H.B.
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Amendment doctrines that would govern the application of such a device
in the circumstances of texting and driving.26 Part III underscores the
27
legal issues surrounding the proposed New York legislation, including
2 8 the strong impact of
the extremely broad permissibility of field-testing,
29
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Riley v. California, and the
key distinctions between the New York proposal and other New York
State (and federal) laws and cases regarding driving under the influence
of alcohol.3" Part IV advocates for further protections, under the New
York proposal, to be afforded to privacy at the expense of law
enforcement efficiency;3" namely imposing an elevated standard of
individualized suspicion on police officers as a prerequisite to
administering a constitutionally permissible field test of a driver's cell
phone at an accident.3 2 The goal of this Note is not to underestimate the
horrific dangers posed by distracted driving.3 3 Instead, this Note attempts
to answer a difficult question: How far may (and should) the police go,
under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when enforcing
vehicle and traffic laws proscribing distracted driving?3 4
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FIELD-TESTING AND THE DIGITAL ERA

Before examining the more captivating Fourth Amendment
doctrine"5 and legal issues36 inherent in the New York legislative
proposal, a basic review of the concept of field-testing is necessary to
fully appreciate what is at stake with the Textalyzer.37 New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") Section 1192 codifies the illegality of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.3 8 To aid in the enforcement of this law, Section 1194 was
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. See infra Part Il.
28. See infra Part Ml.A.
29. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see infra Section IfI.B (eliciting pertinent viewpoints from the
Court's unanimous opinion to argue against warrantless searches of digital contents stored on cell
phones, as proposed in the New York legislation at issue).
30. See infra Part Il.C.
31.

See infra Part IV.

32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Part II.C (reviewing how the Fourth Amendment would apply to field-testing of
cell phones).
36. See infra Part md (suggesting that the current New York Textalyzer proposal contravenes
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
37. See infra Part H.A-B.

38.

N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. L. § 1192 (McKinney 2011).
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adopted, which enumerates the procedures applicable to the
administration of, inter alia, a breath test.39 Section 1225-c(2)(a)
prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle while using a mobile phone,4"
and Section 1225-d precludes the operation of a motor vehicle while
using any other portable electronic device.41 Subpart A discusses the
history and current status of the law with respect to breath tests (for
example, field tests for alcohol).4 2 Subpart B highlights the legislative
effort in New York to adopt VTL Section 1225-e,43 which would aid in
enforcing the ban on the use of mobile phones while driving (that is, the
Textalyzer). 4 Finally, Subpart C discusses how the Fourth Amendment
would apply in the context of field-testing cellphones, the cornerstone of
this Note.45
A. How We Got Here:
CurrentState Legislation Involving Field-Testingfor Alcohol
Under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, the "breath test"
refers to a precursory test of a suspected drunk driver's breath for the
mere presence (or absence) of alcohol by using a preliminary breath
screening device ("PBT"). 4 Conversely, "chemical test" is the phrase
used to describe a test of alcohol content of a suspect's blood using an
instrument other than a PBT. 47 Thus, blood alcohol tests conducted using
a "breathalyzer" are referred to as chemical tests, not breath tests,
because they measure blood alcohol content, not mere presence of
alcohol.48 The VTL indicates that any person who operates a motor
vehicle in the State shall be deemed to have consented to a chemical test
39. See id.§ 1194 (governing the administration of blood tests, the report of refusal, and court
orders regarding chemical testing).
40. See id. § 1225-c(2)(a).
41. Seeid. § 1225-d.
42. See infra Part H.A.
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. See N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6, 2016); N.Y.
Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015). The legislative intent portion,
comprising Section 1 of both the New York State Senate and Assembly proposals, opines that the
field-testing of cell phones to determine whether a driver has been distracted prior to a motor
vehicle accident would help law enforcement officers overcome the difficulty they currently face in
enforcing VTL § 1225-c. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613 (Section 1).
45. See infra Part I.C.
46.

PETER GERSTENZANG & ERIc SILLS, HANDLING THE DWI CASE IN NEW YORK 140

(2012-2013 ed. 2012).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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(administered under the requirements of the statute)-the notion of
implied consent.49 The Textalyzer legislation utilizes implied consent in
an attempt to justify the broad permissibility of field-testing cell
phones.5 ° The New York Court of Appeals has held this legal theory to
be constitutional in the context of blood alcohol testing, subject to
certain limitations.5 1
The PBT is generally used to help establish probable cause for a
driving while intoxicated ("DWI") arrest and is usually the final field
test administered to a suspect at the scene prior to her arrest.52 When
initially determining whether there is cause to believe that a person is
driving while intoxicated, many police departments use preliminary field
sobriety tests before administering a PBT.53 These tests generally entail
requesting the suspect to engage in a number of physical acts, which are
designed to test the person's coordination in order to determine
whether probable cause to believe a person is intoxicated exists.5 4 Such
physical acts include the finger-to-nose, one-leg stand, walk-and-turn,
and finger count.55
A driver is not required by law to participate in requested field
sobriety tests.56 Although a driver is deemed to have given consent to a
chemical test,57 field tests are not as intrusive as chemical tests.58 One
premise for permissibly obtaining a chemical test is the existence of
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has operated a vehicle in
violation of Section 1192 of the VTL.5 9 Chemical testing is governed by
Section 1194(2).60 A plain reading of this statute suggests that a positive
field test can be used to request a DWI suspect to submit to a chemical
test, even in the absence of probable cause to believe there was a
violation of Section 1192.61 However, New York courts have
49. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1194(2)(a) (McKinney 2010).
50. See N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6, 2016); N.Y.
Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015). Section 1 of both proposals
cites to the notion of implied consent as an accepted mechanism in combatting drinking and driving,
and it posits the viewpoint that the dangers associated with distracted driving are analogous to that
of driving while intoxicated. See supra notes 8, 13.
51. People v. Kates, 428 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 1981).
52.

GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 140.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1194(2) (McKinney 2011).

58.

See GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 123.

59.
60.
61.

VEH. &TRAF. § 1194(2)(a).
See id.
See generally id.
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demonstrated grave skepticism as to the constitutionality of the statute if
it were applied in this manner.6 2 Thus, in practice, breath screening tests
are used to help establish probable cause for a DWI suspect's arrest, not
as a probable cause substitute.6 3
Importantly, the New York Textalyzer legislation contains no
probable cause requirement. 64 Probable cause to arrest (or search) exists
where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge,
including reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is
being committed by (or unlawful contraband or evidence of an offense
will be found on) the person to be arrested (or searched).65 As the Bronx
County New York Supreme Court has noted, the New York Legislature
intended to differentiate between preliminary tests performed at the
scene (that is, breath tests) and those conducted back at the station house
(in other words, chemical tests).66 Notably, the court opined that the
rationale for this distinction is based on the conditions surrounding a
field test, which do not give the same assurance of reliability and
accuracy as those in a controlled environment.67
B. Where We Are Headed: New York's Textalyzer Proposal
On June 16, 2011, driver Michael Fiddle crashed his car on the way
to a summer job in Woodbury, New York. 68 A passenger in the vehicle,
nineteen-year-old Evan Lieberman, was severely injured in the
accident. 69 Evan unfortunately died thirty-two days later from those
injuries.7" State law enforcement officials did not criminally charge
Fiddle as a result of the accident.7 1 However, in a subsequent civil suit,
62. GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 141; see also infra Part IH1.C (offering New
York DWI case law to support the argument that unfettered discretion for law enforcement officers
to perform field-testing of either drivers' cell phone at the scene of any accident, absent any indicia
of individualized suspicion, amounts to an unconstitutional practice).
63. GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 140-41.
64. See generally N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6, 2016);
N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015); infra Part f.B.
65. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (holding in the context of the
Textalyzer proposal, the constitutional focus is on the search); infra Part H.B.
66. People v. Reed, No. 2003BX039117, 2004 WL 2954905, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
67. Id.
68. Terence Corcoran, N.Y Family Who Lost Son Fights Distracted Driving, USA TODAY
(May
29,
2013),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/29/ny-father-fightsdistracted-driving/2370837.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Evan's father, Ben Lieberman, obtained Fiddle's cell phone records
from the accident date.72 At a hearing before the New York State
Department of Motor Vehicles, an administrative law judge ruled that
Fiddle violated several laws, including use of his mobile phone while
driving. 73 According to a USA Today article examining the incident,
Rockland County Sheriff Louis Falco indicated that his deputies seek
mobile phone records ifthey suspect that phone use contributed to a
crash, but he also noted that it is not standard procedure to do so absent
individualized suspicion.7 4 In late 2015, Assistant Speaker of the New
York State Assembly Felix Ortiz introduced a bipartisan bill to help
create a protocol for police officers to more vigorously enforce the
VTL.75 This bill would allow the police to promptly field-test drivers'
cell phones to determine if the drivers were distracted immediately
76 This "Textalyzer" bill has been
preceding---or during-an ' accident.
77
designated as "Evan's Law.
In a video interview with NBC's Jeff Rossen, the CEO of Cellebrite
(an Israeli data extraction technology company which manufactures the
Textalyzer) demonstrated how the device works.7 8 While Rossen drove
around a parking lot, he sent a message on Whatsapp (a messaging
application), completed a phone call, and surfed Facebook.79 Afterwards,
Rossen's phone was plugged into the Textalyzer-which looks quite
similar to an iPad.8 ° Once the results loaded in a matter of seconds, it
was clear the Textalyzer device was able to accurately identify both the
exact timing and nature of each electronic action, including each time
Rossen simply swiped his phone screen. 8' Although the device allegedly
does not gather data concerning "what" was typed or "who" was
called-that is, content,82 _it can accurately identify what application
was being used down to the exact time (in other words, metadata).8 3
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Evan's Law Would Allow Cops to Use 'Textalyzer' to Probe Distracted Driving
Allegations, CBS NEW YoRK (Apr. 7, 2016), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/04/07/evans-lawtextalyzer.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Interview with Jim Grady, supra note 11.
79. Id.
80.

Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. For a comprehensive debate concerning the constitutional significance of the content
and metadata distinction in the context of digital searches, see The Futureof DigitalPrivacy,NAT'L
CONST. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/debate/podcasts/the-future-of-digital-
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New York's proposed legislation would grant a police officer unfettered
discretion to utilize this electronic scanning device at the scene of any
4
motor vehicle accident.1
C. The FourthAmendment:
How it Applies to Field-Testingof Cell Phones
The protections provided by the Fourth Amendment apply to
governmental action amounting to "searches and seizures,"85 although it
is not always clear what kind of police inquiries may actually constitute
a search or seizure.86 As recently as 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether the police may compel a motorist, suspected of
drunk driving, to submit to a blood sample (or to a breath test) incident
to arrest.8 7 Prior to that case, the Supreme Court has held that the
administration of a breath test constitutes a search governed by the
Fourth Amendment.88 Such cases are of great significance, but before
addressing the legal arguments implicated by the Textalyzer in Part III,
underlying Fourth Amendment law must be initially examined.8 9 Subpart
1 touches on the initial question, "is it a search and/or seizure?" and
analyzes the ramifications of the answer.9" Subpart 2 discusses
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 91
1. Passing the Threshold of Fourth Amendment Protection
The Textalyzer proposal may only be deemed unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment if attaching an electronic scanning device
to a phone, for the purpose of determining whether a driver was
privacy.
84. N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. L. § 1225-e(2) (McKinney Proposed 2016).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
86. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the installation and
use of a pen register is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), with Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (extending the Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures to protect individuals with a
"reasonable expectation of privacy," such as one who enters a public phone booth, closes the door,
and places a phone call).
87. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2166-67 (2016).
88. Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1988).
89. See infra Part I.C.
90. See infra Part I.C.1.
91. See infra Part ll.C.2.
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distracted, is a "search" or "seizure," since the protections afforded
under the Fourth Amendment are only triggered when police conduct
93
constitutes a search or a seizure.9 2 Under United States v. Jones, there
are two ways police conduct can be deemed a search implicating Fourth
Amendment protection.9 4 One way is if the government physically
95
intrudes on an "effect" for the purpose of obtaining information.
a cell phone has been deemed a constitutionally protected
Importantly,
"effect." 96 Another method is if the police conduct violates an
97 Police conduct
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
violates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy if: (1) the
individual manifested an actual expectation of privacy; and (2) the
manifested expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 98 The reasonable expectation of privacy test challenges, but
does not displace, the physical intrusion test, and thus both tests can be
used to discern whether the Textalyzer field test constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment.99
Fourth Amendment protection also applies to seizures of personal
property, such as a cell phone."' A seizure of personal property "occurs
when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interest[] in that property.""'1 1 If the electronic scanning
device at issue in the New York proposal either violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy, physically intrudes on a constitutionally
protected effect in an effort to obtain information, or meaningfully
interferes with an individual's possessory interest in her cell phone,
Fourth Amendment protections will apply. 0 z

92. Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age? The
Future of the Constitution 2 (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
10-64, 2010).
93. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
94. See id at 405-06.
95. Id. at 406.
96. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014).
97. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 3.
concurring); see Slobogin,
98. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
supra note 92, at 3. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz has ultimately become the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,211 (1986).
99. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
100. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983).
101. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
102. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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2. Exceptions to the Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements
Despite most Americans' skepticism towards technological
surveillance, many searches are carried out without a warrant. 0 3 Just
because police conduct constitutes a search does not always mean a
warrant is required."' Consent is one exception to both the warrant and
probable cause requirements.1" 5 Although not the salient basis of this
Note, it is worth noting that if a motorist voluntarily allows a police
officer at an accident or traffic stop to conduct a field test of her cell
phone, the search is constitutionally permissible.10 6 Another notable
exception to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances. 0 7
Exigencies of a situation may permit a warrantless search in a situation
presenting hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, the risk of imminent destruction
of evidence, the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the presence of
danger to police officers or other persons." 8
The Supreme Court has held that the natural dissipation of alcohol
from the blood stream sometimes, but not always, amounts to an
exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.0 9 The
Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests
for drunk driving."' This is primarily because concern about the
destruction of evidence in a drunk driving investigation (that is, the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream) sometimes constitutes
1
an "exigent circumstance" justifying a search without a warrant. '
Generally, the exigent circumstance exception permits a warrantless
search when an emergency leaves a law enforcement officer with
insufficient time to seek a warrant."i 2 In the context of a warrantless
search, the question is whether the search was reasonable. 3 Because the
search incident to arrest doctrine does not permit a warrantless search of

103. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 9.
104. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
105. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
106. Id.
107. King, 563 U.S. at 460.
108. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
109. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (permitting a warrantless
blood test under the exigent circumstances exception to prevent the destruction of alcohol in the
blood stream through the body's natural metabolic processes), with Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.
141, 145 (2013) (holding that the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol levels in the body after one
stops drinking does not amount to a per se exigency permitting an officer to order a blood test
without first obtaining a warrant).
110. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177-78 (2016).
111. Id.at2173-74.
112. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
113. See Veronica Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
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digital data stored on a cell phone, 1 4 another exception to the
warrant requirement 1must
apply for the Textalyzer concept to be
15
deemed constitutional.
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the special needs
doctrine, which permits a warrantless, and often suspicionless, search
when a perceived need, beyond the normal need for criminal law
enforcement, makes compliance with the warrant and/or probable cause
requirements impractical. 6 The New York legislative proposal
explicitly indicates that law enforcement has had a difficult time
enforcing laws forbidding distracted driving, lending credence to the
notion that any legal justification for the Textalyzer concept would not
extend beyond the normal need for law enforcement. 117 However,
proponents of the concept will point to sobriety checkpoint cases, which
upheld suspicionless and warrantless sobriety checkpoints despite Fourth
Amendment challenges." 8 If the Textalyzer concept in the New York
legislative proposal does not precisely fall under an exception to the
warrant and/or probable cause requirement, it cannot pass constitutional
muster under its current framework. 1 9

114. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014) (holding that, absent exigent
circumstances, a warrantless search of digital data on a cell phone, during a search incident to a
lawful arrest, constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment). The search incident to arrest is
another example of a permissible warrantless search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63
(1969). The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to
search the arrestee's person and any containers found on her, absent any additional justification
besides the execution of a lawful arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
Importantly, the Textalyzer concept does not generally implicate the search incident to arrest
doctrine, which significantly limits the government's ability to conduct a warrantless search. See
infra Part III.B. Even during a search incident to a lawful arrest, a cell phone is not analogous to a
permissibly searchable container, as a cigarette pack was in Robinson. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
115. See infra Partll.B.
116. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6,2016); N.Y. Assemb. B.
A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015); see infra note 150 and accompanying text.
Section 1 of both the New York State Senate and Assembly proposals, entitled Legislative Intent,
indicates that electronic scanning device technology will help law enforcement enforce bans on
mobile telephone use while driving. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613
(Section 1).
118. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding alcohol
sobriety checkpoints because the government's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk
driving outweighs the minimal intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoint).
Notably, in the Textalyzer context under New York's proposal, the interest in preventing accidents
is seemingly moot, as the accident had to have already occurred in order for an electronic field test
to be administered. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016).
119. See infra Part II.
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III. UNFETTERED DISCRETION AND SUSPICIONLESS
FIELD-TESTING OF CELL PHONES: AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH

New York's Textalyzer proposal has been criticized by the
American Civil Liberties Union as having enormous potential for
invasion of privacy. 20 Moreover, participants in a recent studyconcerning privacy in the digital age-opined that cell phone data
should be afforded the highest overall level of privacy (when compared
to other categories of digital information). 21 This Part delineates the
constitutional problems presented by the Textalyzer concept, as
proposed by the New York Legislature.1 22 Subpart A argues that the
proposed New York legislation is an unreasonable warrantless and
suspicionless search, constituting a violation of the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 123 Subpart B focuses primarily on the 2014 U.S.
Supreme Court case Riley v. Californiato further support that notion and
to emphasize that warrantless searches of digital data stored on cell
phones are almost always unreasonable absent exigent circumstances or
other appropriate exceptions to the warrant requirement. 2 4 Finally,
Subpart C highlights the legal (and practical) significance of factual and
procedural distinctions between field-testing for alcohol and field-testing
for digital data. 125 Specifically, Subpart C explains that the latter, in the
context of distracted driving, does not qualify as an126exigent circumstance
like the body's natural dissipation of alcohol does.

120. Jay Stanley, Anti-DistractedDriving "Textalyzer" Technology: Not as Simple as it Seems,
AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION: PRIV. & TECH. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.aclu.orgfblog/privacytechnology/interet-privacy/anti-distmcted-driving-textalyzer-technology-not-simple-it.
121. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require
Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in The DigitalAge, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 49, 55 (2015).
The survey was approved for administration by the Institutional Review Board at California State
University, Long Beach and developed for online administration using Qualtrics software. Id.at 51.
Once approved for administration, participants were acquired from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, a
means for finding survey participants which is experiencing growing popularity. Id. In the context
of transactional surveillance, participants were surveyed on their expectations of privacy
concerning: (1) email; (2) social media; (3) web-browsing history; (4) cloud-based storage files; and
(5) cell phone messages. Id. at 54-55. Notably, over ninety percent of participants felt that law
enforcement should either never have access or at least require an elevated level of suspicion
equivalent of probable cause to obtain access to cell phone messages. Id.at 55.
122. See infra Part III.
123. See infra Part HI.A.
124. See infra PartII.B.
125. See infra Part mi.C.
126. See infra Part III.C.
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A. Textalyzer for DistractedDrivers:Appeasable Yet Unreasonable
It is well settled that intrusions into the body constitute searches
and seizures implicating Fourth Amendment protections. 127 The bodily
intrusion must be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fit within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 128 For example, in
Schmerber v. California,129 the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
extraction of blood because: (i) the police officer had probable cause to
believe the driver, who had just been involved in an accident, was
intoxicated; and (ii) the time required to secure a warrant would result in
the lowering of the drivers' blood alcohol content (that is, destruction of
evidence).13 ° In sharp contrast, New York's Textalyzer bill would
authorize a search of a cell phone absent both probable cause and
concern about evidence preservation."' Because the electronic field-test
of a cell phone constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, 132 granting
police officers suspicionless, unfettered discretion to conduct such a
search would violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures.133
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,13 4 the most recent U.S. Supreme
Court field-testing case, the Court held that the PBT breath test, which is
the less intrusive bodily test, constitutes a Fourth Amendment search
(albeit a permissible one absent a warrant). 135 Under the logic of
Birchfield and Riley, administering a Textalyzer field test of a cell phone
at the scene of an accident, for the purpose of discerning whether a
driver was using her device immediately before the accident, is most
definitely a Fourth Amendment "search."' 36 Notwithstanding these
127. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that an involuntary
extraction of a blood sample to establish whether a motor vehicle operator was driving while
intoxicated constituted a search and a seizure requiring legal justification, such as an exigent
circumstance, an exception to the warrant requirement).
128. Id.at 770.
129. Id.
130. Id.at770-71.
131. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016) (the proposed
amendment to the VTL permitting on-the-scene field-testing of the cell phones of either driver
involved in a motor vehicle accident).
132. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014); see supra Part ELI.A.
133. Stanley, supra note 120.
134. 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016).
135. Id. at2185.
136. See id. (holding that a breath test for presence of alcohol is a Fourth Amendment search);
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (holding that a police officer's physical search of
arrestee's cell phone was a search). As the New York legislative proposal itself explicitly states that
the Textalyzer concept was based off of methods already in place involving field-testing for alcohol,
it is unlikely any reviewing court would deem the electronic scanning device to not amount to a
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cases, the New York Legislature seems to believe that, like the breath
field-test for alcohol at issue in Birchfield, the Textalyzer search falls
37
under an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements.' If
ultimately challenged in court, the State of New York will likely argue
that the justification for the Textalyzer is similar to the underlying
rationale for the sobriety checkpoint search, which is a constitutionally
permissible, warrantless, and suspicionless law enforcement search.' 38
One of the primary justifications of sobriety checkpoints is that the
government's interest in preventing motor vehicle accidents caused by
drunk driving outweighs the minimal intrusion on an individual's
privacy and the added delay caused by the checkpoint. 13 9 Such a
justification is markedly attenuated from the New York proposal-in
order to lawfully administer an electronic field test of a cell phone, the
accident must have already happened! 4 ' Thus, the true purpose of the
Textalyzer is not to prevent motor vehicle accidents; rather, the trueand explicit-purpose of the New York proposal is to enforce traffic
laws already on the books' and to punish offenders more effectively.' 4 2
Although the Supreme Court has upheld alcohol sobriety
checkpoints as constitutional, it has found vehicle checkpoints
established as part of a general law enforcement effort to discover
unlawful drugs and drug traffickers unconstitutional.' 4 3 Despite the
outward similarities in how sobriety checkpoints and drug checkpoints
are carried out by law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court
distinguished each, as the primary purpose of the latter checkpoint was
Fourth Amendment search. See N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Jan. 6,
2016); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015). Statistics cited in
Section I of both proposals underscore the dangers of distracted driving in an apparent attempt to
justify the legislation, which expressly approaches the impairment of distracted driving with similar
methodology to that used to combat drunk driving. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb.
B. A8613 (Section 1); see also supra notes 8, 13.
137. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016) (permitting the warrantless
field-testing of the cell phones, of either driver involved, at the scene of any accident, absent
individualized suspicion of violation of pertinent distracted driving laws); Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at
2184.
138. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding alcohol
sobriety checkpoints because the government interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk
driving outweighs the minimal intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoint).
139. Id.
140. See VEH. & TRAF. § 1225-e.
141. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613 (Section 1). Both proposals
indicate that electronic scanning device technology will help police enforce bans on mobile
telephone use while driving more effectively. See N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1); N.Y. Assemb. B.
A8613 (Section 1).
142. SeeVEH.&TRAF. § 1225-e.
143. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 19

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:325

to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.'" Although the
criminal nature of texting while driving and trafficking narcotics is
concededly different, the distinction between the primary rationale that
ultimately justified the sobriety checkpoint in Michigan State
Departmentof State Police v. Sitz 14 5 and the technology--especially the
methodology used to implement it-at issue in the New York Textalzyer
proposal remains significant; one prevents accidents and the other
punishes drivers involved in them."4 For this reason, the use of an
electronic scanning device at the scene of an accident, for the purpose
of enforcing traffic laws, is more like the checkpoints in Edmond'4 7
than in Sitz and therefore amounts to an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.14 8
B. CuttingBack on WarrantlessSearches of DigitalData:
Riley v. California
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
threatened by technological advancements.' 4 9 Justice Scalia, writing for
a majority of the Court, explicitly acknowledged the negative impact
relatively new "sense-enhancing technology" could have on Fourth
Amendment protections. 150 Just over a decade later, in Riley v.
California,the Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone
seized from an individual who has been arrested as a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a valid exception to the warrant requirement. 5 ' In a

144. Id. at 38.
145. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
146. Compare id. (upholding sobriety checkpoints because the government interest in
preventing accidents caused by drunk driving outweighs the minimal intrusion on an individual's
privacy caused by the checkpoint), with N.Y.S.B. A6325 (Section 1), and N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613
(Section 1). Section 1 of both proposals indicates that electronic scanning device technology will
help law enforcement enforce bans on mobile telephone use while driving. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at
44 (declining to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to
employ a checkpoint that is justified only on the mere possibility that the inquiry may reveal that
any given motorist has violated some law, as the primary purpose of such a program is ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control); supra note 141.
147. Edmond, 531 U.S. at36.
148. Compare Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (striking down suspicionless checkpoint with general
law enforcement purpose), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (upholding suspicionless checkpoint because it
prevents accidents).
149. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
150. Id. at 34-35.
151. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
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unanimous opinion, the Court answered this question in the negative. 52
Riley is a significant roadblock that the New York Legislature must
overcome in order to constitutionally implement the Textalyzer
legislation, specifically because the Supreme Court expressly declined to
utilize a valid warrant exception when it came to searching an arrestee's
cell phone.' 53 The New York Legislature is attempting to codify a
warrantless search of the cell phone of an individual, irrespective of
whether the individual is arrested or not.154 Such logic runs far afoul of
Riley, and the nature of such a search may be even more intrusive than
the one at issue in Riley itself.'5 5
Like the Textalzyer legislation,' 56 the Riley case concerned the
"reasonableness" of a warrantless search of digital data contained on a
cell phone.' 57 Two factors the Court focused on to determine
reasonableness, in the context of a search incident to arrest, were police
officer safety and potential loss of evidence. 15 8 The Riley Court
recognized that digital data stored on a cell phone couldn't itself be used
to harm police officers.' 59 The Court further noted that officers were free
to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure it wasn't hiding a
weapon, such as a razorblade. 16 ° Officer safety considerations are of
162
6
little concern in the context of the Textalyzer,' ' as they were in Riley.
Thus, in Riley, the Court was primarily focused on law enforcement's
interest in preventing the destruction of evidence.' 63
It is unclear whether the Textalyzer's field-testing results would be
influenced by the deletion of text messages and/or call logs. 164 However,

152. Id. at 2485. The full majority opinion consisted of eight justices. Id. The ninth, Justice
Alito, concurred in the judgment, agreeing that law enforcement officers, in conducting a lawful
search incident to arrest, must generally obtain a warrant before searching information stored or
accessible on a cell phone. Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 2485.
154. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016).
155. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part Il.C.
157. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
158. Id. at 2486; see infra Part HI.C. (arguing that, because police officer safety and
destruction of evidence generally are not at issue in the Textalyzer context, those exigent
circumstances do not justify the warrantless field-testing of cell phones).
159. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
160. Id.
161. See infra Part II.C.
162. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
163. Id.at 2486.
164. Interview with Jim Grady, supra note 11 (the video interview does not address the
question of whether an individual can preclude the finding of recent cell phone use or maliciously
alter the test results in any way by deleting previous digital entries and/or actions).
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as early as 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that phone
companies have the capabilities to ensure permanent and detailed
records manifesting telephone use. 165 It is also unlikely that an individual
can permanently preclude either the government or service provider
from accessing her phone use records simply by deleting entries from
her personal device. 166 Importantly, it is worth noting that Ben
Lieberman, 167 in the civil suit concerning his son's death, ultimately
obtained the driver's phone records from his phone company, allowing
Mr. Lieberman to prove the driver was texting while driving. 68 Mr.
Lieberman currently argues that the Textalyzer will provide law
enforcement with less information than a phone record and that emails
and social media use would not show up on a phone record. 169 Privacy
advocates respond that police should nonetheless obtain a warrant before
170
accessing a cell phone, which contains all aspects of private life.
Additionally, 1.2 million tickets were issued for cell phone violations
between 2011 and 2015, and in 2015 alone, 217,000 tickets were issued
for cell phone violations.1 71 Moreover, thirty-nine percent of those
violations were for texting while driving. 17 2 Such empirical research
suggests police have had some success in this area of enforcement,
irrespective of the nature of such unlawful cell phone use (in other
thus
words, whether the offender was sending emails or texting), and
173
efforts to completely bypass Riley are misguided and unjustified.
Two methods of evidence destruction the Riley Court addressed
were remote wiping and data encryption. 7 4 Remote wiping involves a
signal being sent by a third party or when a phone is preprogrammed 1to
75
delete data upon ingress or egress of a certain geographic area.
Encryption is a security feature most smart phones contain in addition to
passwords, rendering data on a phone absolutely protected unless police
165. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (recognizing that phone
companies routinely compile permanent records for the purposes of billing, detecting fraud, and
preventing violations of the law, all of which the Court considered legitimate business purposes).
166. David Goldman, How Police Can Find Your Deleted Text Messages, CNN (May 22,
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/22/technology/mobile/smartphone-forensics/index.html.
167. See supra Part fl.B.
168. Richtel, supra note 12.
169. Allison Dunne, NYS Holds Public Sessions to Study Textalyzer Technology, WAMC:
NORTHEAST PuB. RADIO MIDDAY MAG. (Oct. 5, 2017), http://wamc.org/post/nys-holds-public-

sessions-study-textalyzer-technology.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See infra Part III.C.
174. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014).
175. Id.
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know the password.' 76 With respect to both scenarios, the Riley Court
recognized that their occurrence is unlikely (namely remote wiping),
and, in any event, preventable when police truly need access to the
digital information at issue.' 77 Upon these determinations, the Court
subsequently weighed the government's law enforcement interests
versus individual privacy interests.' 7 8
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a physical search of an
arrestee's clothing and subsequent inspection of the cigarette pack found
in his pocket (in the search incident to arrest context) constituted only a
minor intrusion of privacy when compared to the governmental interest
at stake when performing the search.'79 In Riley, the government
asserted that a search of data stored on a cell phone found on the arrestee
was materially indistinguishable from searches of physical items found
on an arrestee. 180 However, acknowledging the extraordinary differences
between searching a cell phone and searching a cigarette pack, 181 the
Court struck down the government's argument. 182 Under this reasoning,
it can be contended that categorically implementing the concept of fieldtesting a cell phone at every motor vehicle accident is a significant
intrusion of privacy. 183 While law enforcement may be able to enforce
Section 1225-c(1)(c) of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law' 84 more
18 5
effectively with the assistance of the Textalyzer legislation,
the damage that would be done to societal privacy interests renders
it imprudent.' 86

176. Id. But see Nick Statt, FBI Won't Have to Reveal Details on Iphone Hacking Tool Used in
San Bernardino Case, VERGE (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/1/1639
3074/apple-iphone-fbi-hacking-tool-san-bemardino-case-secret-court-order (offering example of
when law enforcement was able to bypass encryption protection).
177. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
178. Id. at 2488.
179. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
180. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488.
181. Id. at 2488-91 (opining that, in demonstrating the infringement on privacy that would
come by way of a warrantless search of digital data stored on a cell phone, a cell phone search
would likely provide the government access to far more intimate details of a person's life than the
most exhaustive search of a house).
182. Id. at2491.
183. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 ("We cannot deny that our decision today will have an
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones ... can provide valuable
incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost."); Stanley, supra
note 120.
184. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
185. Interview with Jim Grady, supra note 11.
186. Stanley, supra note 120 (arguing that the Textalyzer is conceptually too intrusive to be
constitutionally administered without a warrant).
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When weighing the governmental interests against privacy
interests, the Riley Court afforded due consideration to the differences
between physical searches and digital searches. 8 7 The Supreme Court
noted that, in the seemingly pre-historic times preceding the digital era,
individuals did not typically carry around a stockpile of physical records
comprising sensitive personal information throughout a routine day.'8 8
Empowering law enforcement to search the digital contents of a cell
phone is qualitatively analogous to permitting police to search through
the most intimate aspects of many people's lives.'89 In spite of this
argument, those in favor of the Textalyzer proposal argue that the
device is only determining cell phone use, simply pinpointing a
particular action down to a particular time, and thus the intrusion on
privacy is minimal.'9 0
Disclosure of cell phone data can, however, help reconstruct an
individual's specific movements down to the precise minute, permitting
the revelation of detailed information about all aspects of a person's
life. 9 ' Moreover, the average smart phone user has installed thirty-three
"apps," and identifying the nature and use of such apps can together
reveal sensitive information concerning the user's life.' 92 In June 2018,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Carpenterv. United States, 93 a seminal
case which determined that the government contravenes the Fourth
Amendment by accessing, without a warrant, an individual's historical
cell phone location records. 194 That pro-privacy ruling further protects
personal information that happens to be digital.' 95 The outcome seems to
undermine the New York Legislature's rationale for the Textalyzer
187. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Interview with Jim Grady, supra note 11.
191. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the relevance to a constitutional analysis of whether an
individual reasonably expects their movements to be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the government to discern their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and other
personally identifiable information).
192. Brief for the Center for Democracy and Technology as Amicus Curiae supporting
Petitioner at 22, 24, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402). There are over
one million apps available in each of the two major app stores (Apple and Android platforms), and
such apps offer a plethora of ways to document sensitive and intimate information concerning a
person's life. Id. at 9. Such data could implicate significant privacy concerns if disclosed to law
enforcement, regardless of the nature of such disclosure. Id.
193. 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).
194. See Adam Liptak, Warrant Requiredfor Cellphone Tracking Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22,
2018, at Al.
195. See id.
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proposal-imposing limits on the ability of law enforcement to obtain
cell phone activity data (like locational data) because of the sensitive
nature of data stored on cell phones, further protecting digital privacy in
19 6
a way a unanimous Court in Riley did not.
Although the government may implement the legislation with intent
to simply unearth instances of distracted driving, it may very well be the
opening of Pandora's box if the government is given the opportunity to
use the device in a stricter criminal enforcement context. 197 The
likelihood that a field test of a cell phone would reveal reams of private
information is great,' 98 and such digital data stored on cell phones is
constitutionally protected from warrantless searches absent exigent
circumstances. 199 As the Riley Court recognized that the exigent
circumstances exception (as opposed to the search incident to arrest
exception, which does not apply to cell phones under Riley) might justify
a warrantless search of a particular phone, 2°° arguments that texting and
driving constitute an exigent circumstance must be addressed.2 ° '
C. Distinguishingthe Breath Testfrom the Phone Test: Why it Matters
Another exception to the warrant requirement, which allows police
to conduct a warrantless search, is the "exigent circumstances"
exception.20 2 This exception allows for broader application of much of
the logic that justifies the search incident to arrest exception at issue in
Riley.2°3 The New York Court of Appeals has found an exigency to exist
whenever an emergency makes it impossible to obtain a warrant in

196. See Rosen, supra note 17.
197. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). When King was arrested for an assault,
the police obtained a sample of his DNA, pursuant to a state statute, and uploaded the genetic
information to a state database. Id. at 441. The taking and analyzing of the DNA sample was
compared by the Supreme Court to fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking
procedure. Id. at 465-66. Despite amounting to a Fourth Amendment "search," the taking of the
DNA sample was upheld as reasonable as it provided law enforcement officers with a safe and
accurate way to process and identify the arrestee. Id. at 465. Subsequently, the DNA sample
matched one taken from the victim of an unsolved rape. Id. at 441. King was ultimately charged
with the previously unsolved rape. Id. This case demonstrates that law enforcement technology,
despite becoming available for a seemingly limited purpose, could ultimately be utilized in ways not
originally envisioned-the concept at issue in King ultimately became federal law in 2017. See H.R.
Res. 510, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Rapid DNA Act of 2017).
198. Stanley, supra note 120.
199. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014).
200. Id. at 2494.
201. See infra Part Ifl.C.
202. Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2488.
203. Id.
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2°
sufficient time to preserve evidence at risk of destruction. Although
similar to the concerns at issue in Riley (and search incident to arrest
more generally), 2 5 exigent circumstances are different from searches
incident to arrest (which are allowed under a categorical rule) 206 as they
are determined on a case-by-case, totality-of-the-factual-circumstances
basis. 2°7 Despite this exception, the current Textalyzer legislation does
not address a valid, categorical exigent circumstance, like efforts to
prevent drunk driving do, according to the case law.20 8
Administering a breath test for alcohol analysis constitutes a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 9 As such, a motorist
cannot lawfully be compelled to submit to a breath test in the absence of
probable cause. 210 Although New York State generally attempts to use a
PBT breath test to help establish probable cause for a DWI suspect's
arrest, there is a valid argument to be made that probable cause must
already exist before a breath test can lawfully be requested. 211 Whether
there is a dispositive answer to this issue in the context of DWI
investigations is uncertain.2 12 Assuming arguendo, a successful Fourth
Amendment challenge can be made to VTL Section 1194(1)(b) for lack
of an individualized suspicion requirement, such an aspiration is beyond
the scope of this paper.21 3 Rather, the goal of this Note is more modest:
to emphasize that field-testing data on cell phones is entirely different,

204. People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 534-35 (N.Y. 1981).
205. See supra Part u1.B (arguing that concerns for police officer safety and potential
destruction of relevant evidence do not justify warrantless searches of digital contents stored on cell
phones, irrespective of whether or not the search occurs incident to a lawful arrest).
206. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
207. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS m, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 274 (6th ed. 2016).
208. See supra Part M.A.
209. Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1988).
210. See People v. Pecora, 473 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (Wappinger Town Ct. 1984) (holding
VTL § 1194(1)(b) unconstitutional as applied, as the statute authorized a breath test even in the
absence of probable or reasonable cause); see also People v. Kates, 428 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y.
1981) (holding that, so long as probablecause or exigent circumstances are present, a chemical test
was constitutional); People v. Brockum, 451 N.Y.S.2d 326, 327 (App. Div. 1982) (finding of fact
that the police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was driving under the influence, and
thus offering no opinion on defendant's argument that a breath test, absent probable cause that he
was driving while intoxicated, constituted an unreasonable search).
211. GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 143-44. New York courts have generally
sidestepped Fourth Amendment concerns with respect to alleged administration of breath tests
absent probable cause, by finding probable cause existed in cases that uphold the constitutionality of
breath tests. Id. at 144. Those courts have held Section 1194(l)(b) of the VTL unconstitutional, as
applied, in the absence of probable or reasonable cause. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. GERSTENZANG & SILLS, supra note 46, at 143.
213. See infra Part V.
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and more intrusive, than field-testing for alcohol 14 and to underscore
that law enforcement must harbor an elevated level of suspicion-that a
motorist has been driving in violation of VTL Section 1225-c-before a
field test of a cell phone can constitutionally be administered. 15
When, in dicta, the Supreme Court in Riley addressed the future
possibility of an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search of
216
cell phone data, it was in the context of extreme emergencies.
Examples of such emergencies include a suspect texting an accomplice
who is preparing to detonate a bomb, and a child abductor who may
have information about the child's location on his cell phone. 1 7 In the
exceptionally attenuated possibility that such an emergency arises while
officers are at the scene of a motor vehicle accident, and the Textalyzer
device can be useful in unearthing and thwarting an exigency of this
nature, such a search would likely be reasonable given the exigency
dicta in Riley.2 18 But in all other instances, routinely warrantless digital
searches of cell phones are far more intrusive than warrantless breath
searches for alcohol.2 19
One justification for upholding warrantless breath tests, incident to
arrest for drunk driving, is that the physical bodily intrusion that comes
with such testing is "almost negligible. '22 1 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority in Birchfield v. North Dakota,"' analogized a breath test to the
use of a straw to drink beverages, "a common practice and one to which
few object. 22 2 He further opined that people do not "assert a possessory
interest in or any emotional attachment to any of the air in their
lungs. '223 Finally, he stated that the testing process does not result in
"any great enhancement in the embarrassment that is inherent in any
arrest. 22 4 However, the majority also held that warrantless blood tests
were not permissible. 2 5 Justice Alito stated: "a blood test, unlike a
breath test, places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a sample
that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra Part I.B.
See infra Part IV.
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
Id.
Id.
See supra Part IIB.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016).
Id.
Id.at2177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at2184.
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beyond" the driver's blood alcohol content. 226 The majority felt that,
with respect to a blood test for alcohol content, the State offered no
for demanding the more intrusive alternative
reasonable justification
2 27
warrant.
a
without
These are incredibly powerful and important words, from which an
immediate comparison can be drawn to the warrantless Textalyzer cell
phone search. 228 A phone field test, unlike a breath test, may very well
place in the hands of law enforcement content that can be preserved and
from which it may ultimately be possible to extract information far
beyond whether the driver was distracted during an accident.2 29 Unlike
the minimal possessory interest to air in their lungs, but similar to the
possessory interest to their own DNA samples, individuals possess a
high privacy interest in the digital data of their own creation stored on
their cell phones. 23° At least one current Supreme Court Justice is of the
opinion that disclosure of non-content information on cell phones,
commonly referred to as metadata, potentially subjects an individual to
the embarrassment that concerned Justice Alito about blood tests in
Birchfield.231 Another current Justice espoused views that individual cell
phone users may have a property right in their digital metadata, and if
so, a search of such data constitutes a search of a constitutionally
protected "effect. ' 23 2 And empirical evidence shows that even guiltless
individuals are wary of their friends, family and significant others
rummaging through their, potentially embarrassing, cell phones

226. Id.at 2178.
227. Id. at 2184.
228. See supra Part II.
229. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
230. See Scott-Hayward, Fradella & Fischer, supra note 121, at 55; see supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
231. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185; Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43, Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2017) (No. 16-402). At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor expressed the
view that warrantless disclosure of cell phone metadata could potentially unearth private
information such as trips to the bathroom and timing of intimate activities, pushing back against the
notion that only digital "contents," such as what was said in a communication, could embarrass an
individual. Id.
232. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 231, at 52. Newly appointed Justice Gorsuch
seemed interested in the idea that a user may possess a property right in digital metadata of their
own creation and that the government may not exploit such data without an individual's consent. Id.
Justice Gorsuch also seemed to entertain the idea that a government subpoena to obtain an
individual's metadata from a third party, without a warrant, was analogous to an unconstitutional
writ of assistance-such a view, despite seemingly being a minority viewpoint at the argument, can
only discourage New York State lawmakers who feel that a warrant is not required to access cell
phone use information from drivers at the scene of any accident. See id. at 83.
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contents-it is hard to imagine they would feel differently when the
police do the rummaging. 3 3
An additional issue discussed in the case upholding the warrantless
breath test and striking down the warrantless blood test, involved the
concurrence's discussion of how such tests temporally work in
practice-the Birchfield concurring opinion noted that most preliminary
breath tests occur forty-five minutes to two hours after an arrest (for
drunk driving) is effectuated.23 4 The concurrence opined that this time
delay, coupled with technological advancements that facilitate
expeditious processing, made it relatively easier for the police to seek
warrants.2 35 It must be remembered that, despite holding that the breath
test is a permissible warrantless search because the body's natural
dissipation of alcohol presents a risk to evidence preservation, the
warrantless chemical test was deemed unconstitutional despite the
evidence preservation exigency. 236 As evidence preservation is likely not
at issue-as it is with alcohol dissipation-when it comes to the
Textalyzer, 37 and technology has made it possible for police to procure
warrants essentially on demand, 38 the notion that a warrantless search of
a cell phone is more like a breath test than a chemical test is dubious at
best.239 The distinction between the two is critical, as one action is
permissible absent a warrant, while the other requires a warrant
supported by probable cause.24 °
Another legal, and practical, roadblock for the Textalyzer proposal
is the fact that no level of individualized suspicion (such as probable
cause) is required before an electronic field test may be administeredall that must occur is an individual who owns a cell phone be involved in
a motor vehicle accident.2 4' Putting aside the warrant requirement for a
moment, it is important to remember that a warrant unsupported by
probablecause will generally be deemed invalid.24 2 The rationale behind
requiring a warrant supported by probable cause is to prevent arbitrary
233. Ira Hyman, Don't Touch My Phone!, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 8, 2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mental-mishaps/20141 1/dont-touch-my-phone.
234. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2192 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
235. Id.
236. Id. at2184.
237. Goldman, supra note 166.
238. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
241. N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. L. § 1225-e(2) (McKinney Proposed 2016).
242. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227-29 (1983) (establishing the modem-day legal
standard under federal law for discerning whether probable cause exists and reiterating that, despite
lowering the standard, a warrant unsupported by probable cause is invalid).
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government intrusion of constitutionally protected places and to ensure
243
such intrusions are justified due to their limited nature and scope.
Recall that, in the context of drunk driving investigations, New York
courts generally prefer some level of particularized suspicion, derived
from either the smell of alcohol or poor physical coordination in a field
2
sobriety test, before the police administer a field test for alcohol. " Such
level of protection is seemingly absent in the Textalyzer legislation,
which gives police unfettered discretion to administer the device as they
wish.245 Such discretion will inevitably subject non-offenders to the
negative consequences that come with a violation of the VTL against
distracted driving.2 46 The categorical implementation of an electronic
scanning device that could potentially present such perverse incentives,
while significantly intruding on one's digital privacy, cannot be justified
on the basis of a few artificial similarities to the concept of field-testing
for alcohol in a drunk driving investigation. 24 7 There has to be "a limit to
the consequences that motorists may be deemed to have consented to by
virtue of a decision to drive on public roads. 248
IV. SOLUTION: GETTING TO REASONABLE SUSPICION

The foregoing issues discussed lead to the proposed solution to
impose an elevated level of suspicion requirement on a police officer 2 as
49
a prerequisite to administer an electronic field test of a cell phone.
Once the application of the Textalyzer is statutorily limited to a situation
where an officer has reason to believe the driver was distracted by her
cell phone and that such distraction contributed to an accident involving
said driver, opponents of the concept seemingly have less plausible
Subpart A offers initial insight into the
constitutional objections.
243. Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989).
244. GERSTENZANG & SLLS, supra note 46, at 243-44.
245. See supra Part U.B.
246. See Stanley, supra note 120. In his critique of the proposed New York legislation, Jay
Stanley provides the following examples where innocent drivers, engaged in relatively common
practices, may be subject to discipline under a plain reading of the proposal: (i) individuals who
lawfully use phones while driving by way of hands-free operation such as Bluetooth and speech-totext; and (ii) individuals who request a passenger to control the music and/or respond to an
important message. Stanley, supra note 120. Other important questions are whether the device
would detect unlawful use of those who use non-smart phones and how police would know if
someone hands over her work (or other spare) phone, in place of her personal phone, for testing.
Stanley, supra note 120.
247. See supra Part I.
248. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016).
249. See infra Part TV.
250. See infra Part IV.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/19

26

Curran: The Textalyzer: The Constitutional Cost of Law Enforcement Techno

2018]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COST OF LAWENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY

351

concept of reasonable suspicion and why it would legally make a
difference in the Textalyzer context. 1 Subpart B offers an overview of
how such a standard would work in practice. 2
A. Reasonable Suspicion: How It Works
The level of justification required for a search (or an arrest),
2 3 However, much police
pursuant to a warrant, is probable cause.
activity does not amount to the intrusiveness of an arrest or Fourth
2 54
Amendment search that would generally require issuance of a warrant.
Police routinely stop citizens on the street or pull them over in their
automobiles for the purpose of brief questioning or enforcing traffic
laws.2 5' Requiring the higher standard of probable cause in these
6
situations would render most investigative stops impermissible.
25 7
a
Despite being the lower standard in contrast to probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, that a driver was operating a motor vehicle in
violation of VTL Section 1225-c(1)(c), 258 requirement would provide
protection against arbitrary
drivers with important level of constitutional
259
Textalyzer.
the
of
use
and unreasonable
In Terry v. Ohio,26° the U.S. Supreme Court-for the first time in a

criminal investigative context-recognized an exception to the
requirement that Fourth Amendment searches (and seizures) of persons
must be based on probable cause. 261 This exception has been recognized

251. See infraPartIV.A.
252. See infra Part JV.B.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
254. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968) (opining that encounters between police officers
and citizens are rich in diversity, and observing that not every encounter, or investigative technique,
amounts to an unconstitutional intrusion).
255. Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" From Start to Finish: Too Much
"Routine," Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843, 1875-76 (2004).
256. Id. at 1851.
257. See generally Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to
Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 1133 (1998) (offering a critical analysis of
the Terry opinion, particularly with the case's novel departure from the probable cause requirement
in the criminal investigatory context).
258. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-c(1)(c) (McKinney 2011) (codifying unlawful use of
mobile telephones while driving).
259. See infra Part V.B.
260. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
261. See id at 30-31 (departing from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis by: (i) defining a
special category of Fourth Amendment seizures so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the
general rule requiring probable cause to effectuate Fourth Amendment seizures reasonably could be
replaced by a balancing test; and (ii) applying this balancing test in a way for the Court to approve
this narrowly defined, less intrusive seizure, on grounds less rigorous than probable cause).
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as the notion of reasonable suspicion.262 In the years since the Terry case
was decided, the reasonable suspicion standard has permeated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and has become a legally accepted concept
(at least by the Supreme Court).26 3 Terry, and most cases interpreting it,
involved circumstances in which law enforcement sought to unearth
ongoing criminal activity. 264 The Supreme Court has since ruled that the
Terry doctrine also applies when an officer seeks to investigate
a completed offense.2 65 In 1983, the Supreme Court further extended
the Terry analysis of temporary searches and seizures of persons to
personal property.2 66
Categorical opponents of the Textalyzer legislation argue that the
concept could never be constitutional absent a warrant.26 7 However one
can fervently argue in favor of a warrant, such utopian (and admittedly
revered) views are simply not the current law in the drinking and driving
field-testing context, 268 and reasonable suspicion could very well serve
as an effective condition precedent to ensure the constitutionality of the
subject proposal. 269 Therefore, the New York State Legislature should
amend its proposal to require that a police officer harbor an articulable
level of reasonable suspicion that a person was driving in violation of
Section 1225-c of the VTL2 71 prior to administering the field test of that
driver's cell phone at the scene of an accident. 271 Given the
jurisprudence surrounding reasonable suspicion, it is conceivable that
the Textalyzer field test would be deemed a reasonable search provided
2 72
a police officer possessed such a level of suspicion.
262. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (holding that reasonable suspicion can
be established with information different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause and that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than
that required to show probable cause).
263. See Sundby, supra note 257, at 1135-36 (highlighting the long-term consequences of the
Terry opinion).
264. DRESSLER & THOMAS III, supra note 207, at 405.
265. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
266. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (opining that the Terry principle
allows a law enforcement officer with reasonable belief, based on the officer's own observations,
that a traveler is carrying luggage containing drugs, to briefly detain the luggage to investigate the
circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion). Despite extending Terry to personal property,
the Court found the detention at issue to be invalid. Id. at 710.
267. Stanley, supra note 120 (arguing that the Textalyzer concept is categorically too intrusive
to be constitutionally administered without a warrant).
268. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016).
269. See infra Part IV.B.
270. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-c(l)(c) (McKinney 2011) (codifying unlawful use of
mobile telephones while driving).
271. See infra Part IV.B.
272. See infra Part IV.B.
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B. Reasonable Suspicion Typified in the Textalyzer Context
In order to visualize how this concept will work in practiceconsider the following illustrations. 27 3 A police officer's observation of a
vehicle swerving between lanes for a significant distance has been
deemed to constitute a reasonable suspicion, in New York, that the
driver was intoxicated.2 74 Comparably, an officer who observes a driver
swerving, or driving erratically, would meet the requisite level of
reasonable suspicion required to administer a constitutionally
permissible Textalyzer field test under my proposal. 275 Multiple
eyewitnesses who opine that one driver was swerving before an accident
may meet the reasonable suspicion threshold, as would the admission of
a driver concerning her own unlawful actions. 276 At nighttime, an officer
(or live witness) who observes light being emitted from the suspected
vehicle would also have reasonable suspicion that a driver was distracted
while driving due to cell phone use.277 Essentially, such reasonable
suspicion will derive from the visible observation of someone with
firsthand knowledge of the accident's occurrence.2 78
Suppose a law-abiding driver, "Driver A," gives her phone to the
front-seat passenger for the purpose of picking the songs on a roadtrip. 2 79 Now suppose, as the passenger is picking a song and completing
an important phone call for the driver, their vehicle is struck by an
erratic, albeit non-technologically-distracted, driver ("Driver B").28
Under the current New York proposal, the police officer who arrives at
the scene can administer a field test of both drivers' cell phones, which
would result in the erroneous finding that Driver A was in violation of
the traffic law and thus at fault (assuming no other cause for the accident
was unearthed).2 8' Driver A would then be liable for any negative
consequences that come with such a finding of fault.282 This result
should not be permitted when simple limitations, that when crafted into
the current legislative proposal, would likely prevent such an
273. See infra notes 284-89.
274. People v. Brockum, 451 N.Y.S.2d 326, 327 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1982).
275. See supraPart IV.A.
276. See supraPart IV.A.
277. See supraPart IV.A.
278. See supraPart IV.A.
279. See supraPart IV.A.
280. See supraPart IV.A.
281. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016); see supra note 246 and
accompanying text.
282. See VErH. & TRAF. § 1225-e; N.Y. Legis. S.B. A6325, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed
Jan. 6, 2016); N.Y. Assemb. B. A8613, Reg. Sess. 2015-2016 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015).
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outcome.28 3 If the police officer in the hypothetical (which may very
well become non-fictional if the New York proposal comes to
fruition) 284 arrived at the scene of the accident, without any immediately
discemable indication which driver was at fault, the Textalyzer field test
of each driver's cell phone should not be permitted, absent consent of
either driver to the search of his or her respective phone.28 5
One avenue to avoid such an outcome is for the New York
Legislature to slightly amend its proposal.286 Such an amendment could
be incorporated into the field-testing portion of the legislation, 287 after
removing the text permitting unfettered discretion to field test cell
phones at any accident, as follows:
(E) When Authorized. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given consent to a field test, of their
mobile telephone and/or portable electronic device, solely for the
purposes set forth in subpart A of this section (determining whether the
operator of a motor vehicle was using a mobile telephone or portable
electronic device, in violation of either sections twelve hundred
twenty-five-c, or twelve hundred twenty-five-d of this article, at or
near the time of the accident), at the scene of an accident or collision
involving damage to real or personal property, personal injury or
death, at the request of a police officer, provided such police officer:

(1) has reasonable suspicion to believe such person to have been
operating a motor vehicle in violation of either sections twelve
hundred twenty-five-c, or twelve hundred twenty-five-d of this article;
or
(2) obtains informed consent, from the person operating a motor
vehicle involved in an accident or collision involving damage to real or
personal property, personal injury or death, to the field-testing of that
person's mobile telephone or portable electronic device. For purposes
of a field test administered pursuant to informed consent, such police
officer need not have reasonable suspicion, as set forth in subsection
(F)(1).

283. See supraPart IV.A.
284. See Stanley, supra note 120 (offering critically important inquiries concerning the
concept, one being whether the Textalyzer device would discern if it was in fact the driver, or
passenger, who was operating a cellular device preceding an accident); supra note 246 and
accompanying text.
285. See supra Part HI.
286. See supra Part IV.A.
287. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1225-e (McKinney Proposed 2016).
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(F)(1) "Reasonable suspicion" to believe such person to have been
operating a motor vehicle in violation of either sections twelve
hundred twenty-five-c, or twelve hundred twenty-five-d, of this article,
shall be determined by any visible indication of distracted driving on
part of the operator, the sworn statement of any witness to the accident
or collision, provided such witness is not privy to the parties involved
in the accident or collision, and/or any other evidence surrounding the
circumstances of the incident which indicates that the operator has
been operating a motor vehicle in violation of either sections twelve
hundred twenty-five-c, or twelve hundred twenty-five-d of this article.
The burden of proof regarding the presence of reasonable suspicion
shall be on the police officer that administered the field test at issue.
(2) Informed consent shall mean that such motor vehicle operator,
prior to consenting to the field test of their mobile telephone and/or
mobile electronic device, has been informed that they have the right to
decline such testing. A consenting driver need not be informed as to
the nature and scope of such field test; such nature and scope is set
forth in subpart A of this section.
(G) In the event that a field test of a mobile telephone and/or portable
electronic device, at the scene of an accident or collision involving
damage to real or personal property, personal injury or death, is not
administered, or is deemed by a reviewing court to be legally invalid,
the finding of fault regarding the accident, and/or the finding of guilt
regarding the violation of any pertinent traffic laws in connection with
such incident, shall be determined by the default traffic laws already in
field-testing mobile telephones and/or
place, not those involving
288
devices.
electronic
portable
A police officer's procurement of reasonable suspicion that a driver
was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 1225-c(1)(c) of the
289
before administering the
VTL immediately prior to an accident,
electronic field test of a cell phone, would provide the millions of drivers
in New York State greater constitutional protection under the Fourth
Amendment when compared with the proposed suspicionless search at

288. Compare id. § 1225-e (the section setting forth the concept of field-testing under the
current New York proposal), with id. § 1194 (the section setting forth the concepts of field and
chemical testing for alcohol which is currently the law in this area). The proposed statute offered
above provides greater constitutional protection to motor vehicle operators, while still permitting
law enforcement to combat distracted driving more effectively than currently practicable under the
present Vehicle and Traffic Law. See supra Part I.
289. VEH. & TRAF. § 1225-c(l)(c) (codifying unlawful use of mobile telephones while
driving).
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issue. 29 Such protection may tip the scale from an unreasonable search
to one that is reasonable, which would ensure the constitutionality of the
legislative proposal at issue.291
V. CONCLUSION

Tension between advancements in law enforcement technology and
constitutional expectations of privacy that individuals possess is here to
stay.292 The objective of this Note is to facilitate a constructive debate
and to demonstrate the importance of the Fourth Amendment in light of
recent technological advancements. 293 Fourth Amendment issues are
inherently complex and do not always break down along ideological
lines, making line drawing in this context even more difficult. 294 The
solution proposed in this Note focuses on how to better achieve
constitutionality with respect to a novel piece of law enforcement
technology in the State of New York.2 95 However, acting proactively as
a legislature, while being vigilant for the safety of its own citizens, are
key characteristics of any effective governing body. 296 The dangers of
distracted driving are quite horrific,

297

and this Note does not intend to

minimize this hazard, nor does it intend to diminish the potential benefits
290. See e.g., People v. Pecora, 473 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (Wappinger Town Ct. 1984) (holding
VTL § 1194(1)(b) unconstitutional as applied, as the statute authorized a breath test even in the
absence of probable or reasonable cause); see also VEH. & TRAF. § 1194(1)(b) (permitting, on its
face, the police officer at the scene of any accident to administer a breath test for the purpose of
determining whether a motor vehicle operator has consumed alcohol prior to an accident). Given the
grave skepticism towards warrantless searches of digital content on cell phones during a search
incident to arrest, as demonstrated in Riley v. California,134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014), coupled with
the fact that a non-incident to arrest situation further limits a law enforcement officer's ability to
conduct a warrantless search than it would in an arrest situation, imposing a reasonable suspicion
requirement would significantly lessen the chances of a reviewing court deeming the Textalyzer
unconstitutional. See supra Part IV.
291. See supra Part IV.
292. See Scott-Hayward, Fradella & Fischer, supra note 121, at 55; supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
293. See supra Part I.
294. Daniel Epps, What the Bailey' Case May Reveal About Supreme Court Ideology,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/10/what-the-baileycase-may-reveal-about-supreme-court-ideology/264339 (offering an overview of recently decided
U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases to demonstrate that, when it comes to search and
seizure issues, the justices' opinions don't always fall along typically predictable
liberal/conservative divides).
295. See supra Part IV.
296. See 15 Tips for Being an Effective Legislator. January 2011, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/15-tips-for-being-aneffective-legislator.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
297. See supra Part I.
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technological advancements can reap on behalf of society. 298 Rather, this
Note emphasizes legal concerns that come with the use of a specific
law enforcement device 299 and offers a novel legal solution to address
such concerns.3 °°
Christian Curran*

298. See supra PartI.
299. See supra Part M.
300. See supra PartIV.
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